The claimant suffered an injury as a result of an accident at work, for which the defendant employer admitted liability.

Under the pre action protocol the claimant suggested three potential medical experts in the letter of claim, and subsequently one of the expert orthopaedic surgeons was instructed to prepare a report. This report was never disclosed.

Proceedings were issued and the expert report that the claimant relied on in the particulars of claim mentioned the previous undisclosed report.

The defendant employer applied to the court for an order that the first report be disclosed. They argued that disclosure ought to be made a condition of the permission which the claimant needed under CPR r35.4 to rely on the second expert report. The application was initially successful, and a conditional order was granted to this effect. The order was then overturned as the appeal judge felt that the decision overrode the right of privilege.

The defendant appealed to the court of appeal and there was a unanimous decision to restore the first instance judge’s order. Hughes LJ found that:

i) Part 35 of the CPR dealt with experts who were instructed to report ‘for the purpose of proceedings’. Although there is a distinction between an expert instructed privately, and an expert instructed under Part 35, there is no difference in principle between a change in expert instructed for the purpose of proceedings pre-issue, and a change in expert, who is instructed for the purpose of proceedings, post-issue;

ii) Once a party has commenced the pre-action protocol procedure, there is no good reason as to why an expert’s report should not be disclosed; and

iii) It was necessary for the court to exercise its discretion under CPR 35.4 in order to discourage so called ‘expert shopping’, and to maximise the information available to the court.

Parties who are dissatisfied with the contents of an expert report therefore need to be aware that the courts have this discretionary power under CPR r35.4, and will order the disclosure of earlier reports if they feel it is in the interests of justice to do so.

The FSCS has paid out millions to consumers following the collapse of Keydata in June 2009.

In the last week it has instructed Herbert Smith to send letters to hundreds of IFAs relating to Lifemark products: the Secure Income Bond 4, Secure Income Plan 1 – 12 and Defined Income Plan 1 – 8, requesting early payment of claims. We understand that Herbert Smith will be sending similar letters relating to other products in the coming weeks.

From a professional negligence perspective, it is unclear how the FSCS and Herbert Smith have reached the conclusion that the advice on these products was negligent. No doubt the professional indemnity insurers of IFAs forwarded a letter will be examining the issues carefully.

However, IFAs need to ensure that they speak to their insurance broker or insurer as soon as they receive any letter from Herbert Smith. Even if no letter has been received it is worth speaking to your insurance broker to discuss whether a notification under your PI policy is appropriate.

However, if you have made a notification and it has been declined then please contact us as we may be able to assist. We are currently forming a group of IFAs which have Keydata exclusions, or have had Keydata notifications declined, which can share the legal fees involved in defending the claims against them, thereby massively reducing the cost.

Please email info@fenchurchlaw.co.uk
or call 020 7337 6116 and ask for Rob Fink

The claimant landlord claimed for dilapidations arising out of alleged breaches of the repairing covenants of an underlease, particularly in relation to the air conditioning system.

The defendant made a part 36 offer to settle the dispute on 11.04.2011. In May, June and July 2011 the claimant offered to mediate. On each occasion the defendant refused.

On 10.01.2012, the day before the trial, the claimant accepted the part 36 offer, as it came to light that the defendant was to amend its defence to the effect that the air conditioning did not fall within the definition of the demised premises in the underlease.

The usual costs consequences of this acceptance are set out in CPR r.36.10(5) which would be that the claimant would be liable to pay the defendant’s costs from the date of the expiry of the relevant period to the date of acceptance.

However, the court ordered:

i) that the defendant pay the claimant’s costs on the standard basis up until the end of the relevant period; but
ii) that there should be no order as to costs from the the end of the relevant period to acceptance.

The defendant therefore lost the right to recover costs under CPR r.36.10(5).

The court found it was unreasonable to have refused to mediate, particularly as the court believed that there was a reasonable prospect that the dispute could have been settled during the mediation.

This decision highlights how the court will use its wide discretion on costs and move away from the default position under CPR Part 36 in circumstances where parties refuse to mediate. Parties must recognise that mediation is a fundamental part of the litigation process, and a refusal to mediate can result in severe costs sanctions.

The Claimant owned an investment fund containing a substantial proportion of asset-backed securities. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, the asset-backed securities became increasingly illiquid, making their valuation more and more subjective. The Claimant decided to switch to a different source of prices, which resulted in a fall in value of units of the fund by 4.8%. There followed a mass of complaints, and due to the Claimant’s fears that many of its customers would make a claim, it made a cash injection into the fund of over £100 million.

The Claimant then sought to recover the cash injection from the Defendant, which was the Claimant’s professional indemnity insurer, on the basis that the cash injection constituted ‘mitigation costs’. Under the insurance policy mitigation costs were described as:

“…any payment of loss, costs or expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred by the assured in taking action to avoid or reduce a third party claim (or to avoid or reduce a third party claim which may arise from a fact, circumstance or event) of a type which would have been covered under this policy”.

The Defendant insurers argued that the payments were made for the dominant purpose of reducing damage to the Claimant’s brand, and not for avoiding claims and, as such, were not covered under the policy.

Mr Justice Eder rejected this argument and ruled in favour of the Claimant, deciding the correct approach was to look at the intended effect of the payment, not the motive behind it. The mitigation clause was not concerned with purpose, only with whether the intended result was to reduce claims.

The Judge also dismissed the argument that there should be apportionment to reflect the fact that there may have been mixed motives (to reduce claims, and to protect reputation). He also commented that insurers should not inappropriately attempt to apply the marine property insurance principle of apportionment to professional liability policies.

There has been much debate in the press, as well as within the insurance and legal industries, as to whether businesses can claim compensation under the Act for consequential losses, ie for losses other than damage to property, such as loss of profits. The government has, perhaps unsurprisingly, stated that only damage to property can be compensated under the Act. If consequential losses were to be allowed then the cost of the riots to the police and, by extension, the taxpayer would rise exponentially.

However, having reviewed the Act and the relevant Regulations, it is unclear on what basis consequential losses would be excluded.

The Act states:

Where a house, shop, or building in a police area has been injured or destroyed, or the property therein has been injured, stolen, or destroyed, by any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together, such compensation as hereinafter mentioned shall be paid out of the police fund of the area to any person who has sustained loss by such injury, stealing, or destruction…

Claims for compensation under this Act shall be made to the compensation authority of the police area in which the injury, stealing or destruction took place, and such compensation authority shall inquire into the truth thereof, and shall, if satisfied, fix such compensation as appears to them just

It is in our view arguable that loss arising from the destruction of property can properly be said to include consequential loss. Further, the only restriction on the calculation of the loss is limited to what appears “just”, albeit what is “just” is to be determined by the compensation authority itself leading, perhaps, to a conflict of interests.

In any event, until the issue is decided, businesses may wish to include consequential losses in claims for compensation made to the body set up by the government in Glasgow for the purpose of handling the claims but ensure that they do so within the 42 day time limit from the date of the damage to property during the riot.

Quinn Insurance Limited (“the Insurer”) provided public liability insurance to one of the Claimants’ sub-contractors (“the Policyholder”). The Policyholder was sued by the Claimants in relation to a fire which occurred in 2006, and the Insurer refused indemnity under the public liability cover in February 2009 alleging that the Policyholder had been in breach of certain policy conditions.

The Claimants’ claim against the Policyholder was successful, and damages were assessed by the Court at two separate hearings, on 11th December 2009 and 13th January 2010. The Policyholder failed to satisfy the judgement obtained by the Claimants, and went into liquidation shortly afterwards. The Claimants then issued proceedings against the Insurer, under the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 (“the 1930 Act”), in April 2010.

The Insurer defended the 1930 Act claim on the basis that there was a clause within the policy which required a dispute about liability under the policy to be referred to an arbitrator within 9 months of the dispute arising. The Insurer said that such a dispute arose when it refused indemnity in February 2009, and that the Claimants’ 1930 Act claim was therefore time-barred. The judge at first instance, hearing the matter as a preliminary issue, found in favour of the Insurer.

On appeal the Claimants succeeded in arguing that the 9 month time limit did not begin to run until the Policyholder’s liability had been established and quantified. The Court of Appeal followed Post Office v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Limited [1967] 2 Q.B in finding that an insurer’s liability under an indemnity policy does not accrue unless and until the existence and amount of the Policyholder’s own liability has first been established.

In this case the arbitration clause therefore did not operate to bar the Policyholder’s claim, since quantum was not established until December 2009 / January 2010 and the Claimant’s 1930 Act claim, which was issued in April 2010, was therefore brought within the nine month period required by the policy.

Two points of Austrian law are relevant:

1. Austrian law provides that legal expenses insurance contracts may state that a policyholder may only select lawyers who have their chambers in the geographical location where judicial proceedings are at first instance to be conducted; and

2. In Austria lawyers in certain ancillary services in civil law disputes are remunerated by a flat fee. That fee is doubled if the service is provided outside of the lawyer’s particular geographical location.

Mr Stark was the policyholder under a legal expenses policy provided by DAS. In 24.03.2006 he brought an employment claim against his former employer in the Labour and Social Security Court in Vienna. Mr Stark lived approximately 600km away from Vienna and instructed a lawyer local to him.

Mr Stark made a claim under his legal expenses policy and DAS paid his lawyer EUR 5,782.19 by reference to the single flat rate not the double flat rate. DAS also made an application seeking an order that Mr Stark pay the premium of EUR 211.46 due under the policy. Mr Stark made a counter-claim for EUR 3,000, being the balance between the single flat fee DAS had paid and the double flat fee which his lawyer charged Mr Stark and which was not paid by DAS.

Mr Stark ultimately asked the European Court of Justice to decide whether the restriction placed on legal expenses policyholders by Austrian law was contrary to Article 4(1) of Directive 87/344/EEC which guarantees freedom of choice of lawyer to legal expenses policyholders.

The ECJ ruled that the question at issue was not, in fact, a question pertaining to the freedom of choice of lawyer, but instead on the scope of cover available under an insurance policy and that such a question is not subject to the Directive. It noted that Mr Stark had been able to freely select his lawyer but that did not mean that the insurer was required to reimburse all the lawyer’s fees, regardless of geographical location.

The Court did note however that this should be “on condition that that freedom is not rendered meaningless. That would be the case if the restriction imposed on the payment of those costs were to render de facto impossible a reasonable choice of representative by the insured person.”

The Claimant suffered subsidence damage to his property caused by the roots of a tree which was owned by the Defendant. The Claimant claimed on his house insurance policy for the damage, and his insurer provided him with a full indemnity. The insurer then proceeded to exercise its right of subrogation and instructed a firm of solicitors who were to work under a collective conditional fee agreement.

The claim succeeded but the Defendant objected to the payment of the success fee on the basis that the Claimant was never at any risk of having to pay costs as he had the benefit of an insurance policy. At first instance this argument was upheld. The Claimant appealed the decision and the Court of Appeal has now reinstated the success fee.

In reaching its decision the Court followed the decision of the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN (No.2) [2005] UKHL 61 and allowed recovery of the success fee, holding that “the mere fact that a person is able to fund litigation without resorting to a conditional fee agreement does not make it unreasonable for him to do so”.

The Court also dismissed as without merit any argument that the case was comparable to the ECHR decision in MGN v UK (Application No. 39401/04) on the grounds that (i) the question of whether the success fee interfered with freedom of speech was not applicable; and (ii) as the liability to pay a success fee did not interfere with the Defendant’s rights under the European Convention for Human Rights in this case, questions of proportionality and reasonableness did not arise.

NES was approached by a new, apparently wealthy, client and asked to provide an undertaking to pay Halliwells £1.5 million as part of a share purchase agreement. The client provided a “gold delivery certificate” purported to be worth £10 million. The partners of NES, in reliance on the certificate, but knowing the funds had not cleared, provided the undertaking. The certificate was later found to be worthless.

NES failed to honour the undertaking and was sued by Halliwells. Halliwells obtained summary judgment. The professional negligence insurers of NES, Quinn, refused to pay the claim made by NES on the basis that:

i) the partners of NES were dishonest or condoned dishonesty;
ii) that the undertaking was not given in a solicitorial capacity; and
iii) that the undertaking was given for the benefit of NES (ie a £15,000 fee)

It was held that NES had acted dishonestly and as such Quinn was not required to provide an indemnity.

Solicitors should always carry out the requisite money laundering checks and consistently be on the look out for unusual transactions. With regard to undertakings the giving of an undertaking in a ‘solicitorial’ capacity requires substantive legal advice to have been given or a legal service provided. Undertakings have to be given in connection with legitimate legal work and not merely in order to receive remuneration.

However, in Jones v Kaney the Supreme Court held by a majority of 5:2 that immunity for experts should be abolished. In this case the Claimant was involved in a road traffic accident. When bringing proceedings his solicitors appointed Dr Kaney, a consultant clinical psychiatrist, who initially concluded that Mr Jones was suffering from severe PTSD.

When only quantum remained in dispute Dr Kaney held discussions with the Defendant’s expert. A joint experts’ report was then signed that was extremely damaging to Mr Jones’ claim and contrary to Dr Kaney’s initial prognosis. The Claimant ultimately settled for significantly less than could have been achieved without this joint statement.

The court held it would be unjust for Dr Kaney to be immune from the effects of signing a statement which detrimentally affected the Claimant, especially when she admitted afterwards that it did not reflect what was agreed in the telephone conversation, and that she had felt pressurised to agree to it.

The majority were confident that this would not reduce the number of practitioners willing to give expert evidence and would not make an expert witness less likely to be willing to concede points or to comply with his duty to the court. They disregarded the suggestion that experts would quickly become subject to a multiplicity of claims and the decision is an attempt to ‘professionalise the expert witness industry’.